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Yadkin Valley Bank & Trust Co. tI. 
McGee: BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEE 
ABSOLVED OF PERSONAL 
UABILITY ABSENT WILLFUL 
MISCONDUCT 
It was recently held by the United States 
Court of Appeals, in Yadkin Valley Bank & 
Trust Co. '0. McGee _ F.2d _ (4th Cir. 
1987), that a bankruptcy trustee, although 
appointed by a federal court, does not have 
absolute immunity while adminstering a 
bankrupt estate. The court of appeals 
reversed the district court's affirmance of 
the Bankruptcy Court ruling and has 
remanded the case for further factual find-
ings. 
On July 15, 1981 John and Ruth Hut-
chinson filed a voluntary Chapter 7 
petition in the United States Bankruptcy 
Court for the Middle District of North 
Carolina. The debtors owned a dairy farm 
and the equipment which was used to 
operate the farm. The property had two 
mortgages, the first was owned by R.A. 
Newman for $62,000.00 and the second 
was granted to the plaintiff-appellant, 
Yadkin Valley Bank & Trust Co. for 
$34,429,08. In addition, the dairy equip-
ment was subject to liens by various 
secured creditors totalling $18,000.00. 
In September, 1981, two months after 
the petition was flled, Bert Holbrook 
offered to purchase the property and the 
equipment for $135,000.00. This offer was 
accepted by the trustee on December 14, 
1981 upon the condition that the two 
mortgagees accept the offer as well. In the 
meantime, lienholders of the dairy equip-
ment began repossession proceedings. 
After realizing that some of the equipment 
had been taken from the property, 
Holbrook reduced his offer to 
$122,000.00. As time passed and before the 
sale was consummated, Holbrook's offer 
had fallen to $80,000.00. Because value of 
the land had fallen below that which 
would sufficiently cover the two mort-
gages, Trustee McGee abandoned the 
property pursuant to a court order. The 
land was then foreclosed at which time it 
was purchased by the second mortgage 
holder, Yadkin Valley, for $78,000.00. 
The plaintiff-appellant sued McGee for 
violating the duties of a trustee. As provid-
,ed in the United States Code Annotated, 
the duties of a trustee include to, "collect 
and reduce to money the property of the 
estate for which such trustee serves, and 
close such estate as expeditiously as is com-
patible with the best interests of parties in 
interest." 11 U.S.C.A. S704(1) (Supp. 
1987). Yadkin alleged that McGee's con-
duct in administering the bankrupt estate 
was negligent and that the sale of the farm 
was not administered expeditiously, nor 
was the administration in the best interest 
of the parties. The bankruptcy court 
granted the defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment, holding that a trustee had 
absolute immunity from suit in this case. 
The United States District Court affirmed 
the lower court decision. 
On appeal the United States Court of 
Appeals, sought to define the specwc 
immunity that a trustee has in bankruptcy. 
The issue is clearly reviewable by the court 
which held that trustees in bankruptcy do 
not hold an absolute immunity to suit. 
The court relied on a case previously 
decided by it which held that, 
[w]hen acting within the discretionary 
bounds of his authority, it is settled 
that the trustee may not be held liable 
for any mistake of judgment; that his 
liability personally is "only for acts 
determined to be willful and deliberate 
in violation of his duties" and speci-
fically that he is liable solely <tin his 
official capacity. for acts of negligence. .. 
Sherr '0. Winkler. 522 F.2d 1367, 1375 
(10th Cir. 19n), relying on Mosser '0. 
Darrow. 341 U.S. 267 (1951). (Empha-
sis added). 
McGee, _ F.2d _ (4th Cir. 1987), 
(quoting United States '0. Sapp. 641 F .2d 
182, 184-185 (4th Cir. 1981). 
The facts in Sapp consist of the trustee 
giving a post-dated $3,100.00 check from 
the bankrupt estate to the plaintiff as resti-
tution for prior months of unpaid lease 
payments. Both the trustee and lessor 
believed the debtor would be successful in 
the future in lieu of the reorganization. 
However, the check was returned twice 
for insufficient funding and the plaintiff 
sued. The court held that the trustee was 
not negligent in his conduct, and that at 
most he was guilty of a "mere mistake of 
judgment." United States '0. Sapp. 641 F.2d 
at 184. 
In summary, Sapp illustrated that when a 
trustee is acting within his authority or 
under direct order of the court in continu-
ing a business in bankruptcy, he can not be 
held liable as a trustee. By being appointed, 
he is provided with certain authority and 
vested with a great deal of discretion. 
Therefore a mere mistake in judgment will 
not result in personal liability against him. 
As stated in Sapp, for a trustee to be held 
personally liable he must be acting outside 
of his authority. 
In the case at bar the question was 
whether McGee's failure to expedite the 
sale of the farm constituted negligence or 
a mere mistake of judgment. H it was one 
of mistaken judgment, then regardless of 
the damages, the trustee would be 
immune. To the contrary, if the trustee's 
acts were deemed negligent, willful and 
deliberate, then immunity would not be 
applicable. Thus, becauSe the controversy 
centered on questions of fact the United 
States Court of Appeals remanded for fur-
ther findings. 
Generally, the bankruptcy laws were 
designed to help the debtor or the debtor's 
business survive financial crisis. The trus-
tee is appointed to aid in this procedure 
and his duties are statutorily defined in the 
United States Code Annotated. However, 
trustees should be aware that although 
appointed by the court, their actions are 
not absolutely immune. Although it 
appears that a trustee's immunity does 
blanket his conduct to a large degree, a 
deliberate act outside of a trustees discre-
tion is not protected. 
- Lynn R. Jfeagher 
For Halifax Packing Co. tI. Coyne: 
SEVERANCE PAY BENEFITS DO 
NOT FLOW FROM ERISA IN 
INSTANCES OF PlANT CLOSINGS 
In Fort Halifax Packing Co. '0. Cuyne, 107 
S.Ct. 2211 (1987), the United States 
Supreme Court held that a Maine statute 
requiring employers to pay employees sev-
erance pay in the event of plant closings 
did not "relate to any benefit plan" within 
the meaning of the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act (ERISA) preemption 
provision. 
Fort Halifax Packing Company (Fort 
Halifax) purchased an existing poultry 
packaging and processing plant in 1972 and 
operated it for approximately nine years 
until its closing in May of 1981 for unspe-
cwed business reasons. The plant had been 
operating continuously for nearly thirty 
years and its closing left over one hundred 
employees out of work. Eleven employees 
brought suit in Maine Superior Court 
seeking enforcement of Me. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. tit. 26, S625-B (Supp. 1986-1987). 
Essentially, the statute provides that any 
employer who closes a plant with one hun-
dred or more employees, or relocates a 
plant more than one hundred miles away, 
must provide one week's severance pay for 
each year of employment to all employees 
who had worked in the plant at least three 
years. The employer is excused from this 
provision if the employee accepts employ-
ment at the new location or is covered by 
a labor contract which deals with the issue 
of severance pay. 
The Maine Director of the Bureau of 
Labor Standards also brought an action to 
enforce the statute and, under the terms of 
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the statute, his action took precedence 
over that of the eleven employees. Id, 107 
S.Ct. at 2212. The court rejected Fort 
Halifax's argument that the Maine statute 
was preempted by ERISA, holding that 
ERISA preempted only benefit plans creat-
ed by employers or employee organiza-
tions. Since this case involved a benefit 
plan which arose by operation of state law, 
ERISA did not apply and there was no 
preemption problem. 
The Supreme Court, while affirming the 
judgment of the Maine Supreme Judicial 
Court, rejected their rationale. Under the 
Maine court's analysis, states could set up 
benefit plans because only employers and 
employee organizations were barred by 
ERISA from doing so. What the Maine 
court· failed to recognize, however, was 
that such an analysis was in direct conflict 
with the Congressional purpose for enact-
ing ERISA. Congress wanted to establish a 
uniform set of administrative practices in 
dealing with employee benefits, thereby 
eliminating conflicting regulatory require-
ments. By allowing states to set up benefit 
plans sua sponte there could still be serious 
conflicts between state benefit plans and 
benefit plans provided for by ERISA. 
Recognizing the fallacy· of the lower 
court's reasoning, the Supreme Court took 
a different approach. The Court held that 
the Maine statute was valid because it nei-
ther established, nor required, employers 
to maintain an "employee benefit plan" as 
that phrase was interpreted by Congress. 
In so holding, the Court rejected Fort 
Halifax's principle argument that any state 
law which deals with an employee benefit 
listed in ERISA automatically regulates an 
employee benefit plan and is therefore 
preempted. 
The Court stated three reasons for its 
ruling. First, the Court decided that the 
plain language of ERISA is contrary to 
Fort Halifax's interpretation. The preemp-
tion provision of ERISA applies only to 
employee benefit plans, not employee ben-
efits. The Maine statute providing for sev-
erance pay gave employees a benefit but 
did not establish a benefit plan. The Maine 
statute requires no regulatory scheme or 
administrative programs that could be con-
strued as a "plan." It merely establishes a 
one-time payment conditioned upon the 
happening of a specific event. Id. at 2213. 
Second, the Court analyzed the legisla-
tive history and determined that Congress' 
principle purpose in enacting ERISA was 
to eliminate conflicting state and local 
regulations. Id. at 2216. Companies fre-
quently conduct business in many dif-
ferent cities and states, thus making 
compliance with state and local regulations 
both burdensome and inefficient. Byestab-
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lishing a system of federal regulations to 
control benefit plans, Congress hoped to 
make it easier for employers to do business 
while at the same time protecting the pen-
sion and benefit rights of employees. 
Examining the Maine statute in light of 
ERISA's purposes, it was clear to the 
Court that none of the Congressional con-
cerns were present in this case. Id. at 2213. 
Finally, the Court noted that another 
purpose of ERISA was to mandate disclo-
sure requirements, thus providing safe-
guards "with respect to the establishment, 
operation, and administration of 
(employee benefit) plans." 29 U.S.c. 
§1001(a) (1982). Since there were no 
administrative regulations or continuous 
activities involving a "plan" under the 
Maine statute, disclosure would be mean-
ingless and safeguards unneccessary. 
The Court's decision in Fort Halifax 
allows states to provide statutory benefits 
to employees as long as they require no 
continuous administration constituting a 
benefit plan. 
- Steven E. Sunday 
Emmert v. Hearn: "ALL MY 
PERSONAL PROPERTY" CLAUSE 
CONSTRUED TO ENCOMPASS 
TESTATOR'S TANGmLE AND 
INTANGmLE PERSONAL 
PROPERTY 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland in 
Emmert v. Hearn, 309 Md. 19, 522 A.2d 
377 (1987), held that a testator's intangible, 
as well as tangible, personal property pass-
ed to his surviving children under a para-
graph in a will that read: "I bequeath all 
my personal property to my surviving 
children." In so holding, the court of 
appeals affirmed the court of special 
appeals' reversal of the circuit court ruling. 
George Roberts, the testator, died in 
1981. He was survived by seven children. 
His wife had predeceased him eleven years 
prior, and a son had died in 1971, leaving 
one child. Roberts left a will (executed in 
1977) in which he bequeathed all of his 
personal property to his surviving children 
to be divided equally. 
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